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INTRODUCTION
If a carbon tax is passed that affects Louisiana or nearby states,
Louisiana mineral lessors may find a new source of royalty payments. One 
way of implementing a carbon tax is to charge companies for each ton of
carbon dioxide they emit into the atmosphere,1 creating an economic
Copyright 2020, by SCOTT JOHNSON.
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648 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
deterrent to releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Depending on
the process generating the carbon dioxide, some industries could develop 
methods of capturing the carbon dioxide that they produce but would then 
need somewhere to sequester2 (store) it in order to avoid the carbon tax. 
One long-term solution is subsurface sequestration, which involves 
pumping carbon dioxide into underground pore space in order to avoid 
releasing it into the atmosphere.3 When properly managed, carbon dioxide
can be stored underground for 10,000 years with only a small risk of 
carbon dioxide leaking into the atmosphere.4 
If a carbon tax were passed, mutually beneficial relationships could 
develop between companies that seek to avoid the carbon tax and oil
producers that sometimes use carbon dioxide in enhanced oil recovery 
projects.5 Depending on the severity of the carbon tax, some companies 
might pay oil operators to take their carbon dioxide and either use it for 
carbon injection oil recovery or simply sequester it in the subsurface.
Carbon dioxide injection would allow the company who initially produced 
and captured the carbon dioxide to avoid releasing it into the atmosphere, 
thereby avoiding the carbon tax, and allowing the operator access to a 
source of carbon dioxide that is cheap, free, or possibly even one that they 
will be paid to use.
1. Ann R. Klee, Where is U. S. Climate Policy Headed?, 28 E. MIN. L.
FOUND. §1.03 (2007).
2. What is Carbon Sequestration?, USGS, https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-
carbon-sequestration?qt-news_science_products=0#qt-news_science_products
[https://perma.cc/E4UD-3A2W] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
3. Kevin Bullis, Cheaper Ways to Capture Carbon Dioxide, TECH. REV.
(June 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/515881/cheaper-ways-to-
capture-carbon-dioxide/ [https://perma.cc/66XQ-J2G9]; Daisy Dunne, World can 
‘Safely’ Store Billions of Tonnes of CO2 Underground, CARBON BRIEF (June 12, 
2018), https://www.carbonbrief.org/world-can-safely-store-billions-tonnes-co2-
underground [https://perma.cc/9PBF-SMTA].
4. Dunne, supra note 3.
5. The following statement explains what this project is:
This process of injecting CO2 into existing oil fields is a well-known 
“enhanced oil recovery” (EOR) technique: the addition of CO2 increases
the overall pressure of an oil reservoir, forcing the oil towards production 
wells. The CO2 can also blend with the oil, improving its mobility and 
so allowing it to flow more easily.
Christophe McGlade, Commentary: Can CO2-EOR Really Provide Carbon-
Negative Oil?, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.iea.org/news
room/news/2019/april/can-co2-eor-really-provide-carbon-negative-oil.html [https:
//perma.cc/TL4M-8QB2].
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6492020] COMMENT
If the operator were paid to use the carbon dioxide, would they be 
required to pay royalties for the payments they receive? One Louisiana
Supreme Court decision, Frey v. Amoco Production Company, could
create an opportunity for Louisiana land, servitude, or royalty interest
owners (referred to as lessors for convenience) to receive royalty payments
on carbon dioxide used in enhanced oil recovery projects. The court’s 
ruling required mineral lessees to pay royalties to the lessor for all the 
economic benefits that they gain through the use of the leased land.6 If the
mineral lessee (the oil and gas producer) is paid to use the carbon dioxide,
the Frey ruling could require the lessee to pay royalties on the carbon 
dioxide used in enhanced oil recovery projects.7 
This Comment analyzes the likelihood of the reasoning from Frey
being used to require mineral lessees to pay royalties on carbon dioxide 
used for enhanced oil recovery projects if they were paid to use the carbon 
dioxide in enhanced oil recovery projects.
Part I covers part of the Louisiana Mineral Code and the rights that are
relevant to this Comment. This section also includes an explanation of the 
Frey ruling. Part II presents cases from other states that have both followed 
and distinguished Frey. Part III examines how likely courts are to use logic
similar to that used in Frey, thereby requiring that lessees pay royalties on
carbon dioxide that they are paid to use. It will also discuss whether other 
states are to require royalty payments in a similar situation, whether a
landowner or a servitude owner would be entitled to the payments,
possible liabilities that the injecting lessor should avoid, and what costs 
may be deductible from royalty payments.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Parts of the Louisiana Mineral Code
In Louisiana, unlike in some other states, ownership of the land does 
not include ownership of oil or gas in the ground.8 Louisiana considers oil 
and gas “fugitive minerals” because they can flow from one place to
6. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 180 (La. 1992).
7. “Enhanced oil recovery (EOR), a stage of hydrocarbon production that 
involves use of sophisticated techniques to recover more oil than would be
possible by utilizing only primary production or waterflooding.” Oilfield 
Glossary, SCHLUMBERGER, https://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/en/Disciplines
/Enhanced-Oil-Recovery.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZNB4-9HVQ] (last visited Oct.
24, 2018).
8. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (2018); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s 
Heirs, 91 So. 207, 211 (1920).
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650 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
another below the surface.9 As fugitive minerals, oil and gas are not subject 
to ownership until reduced to possession through production.10 Ownership
of land comes with the right to explore for and produce minerals.11 
Landowners may also “convey, reserve, or lease” their rights to explore 
for and produce minerals, allowing these rights to be separated from the
land.12 
Mineral servitudes allow someone other than the landowner to explore 
for and produce minerals from the land.13 Landowners can create mineral
servitudes as long as they possess the right to explore for and produce
minerals on the land. The holder of a mineral servitude may use “so much 
of the land as is reasonably necessary to conduct his operations,”14 but is
obligated, “insofar as practicable, to restore the surface to its original 
condition at the earliest reasonable time.”15 
A mineral lease is a contract granting a lessee the right to explore for 
and produce minerals from the land.16 The Louisiana Civil Code
provisions that apply to ordinary leases are also applicable when
interpreting provisions in mineral leases.17 This is because the Louisiana
Mineral Code is supplementary to the Louisiana Civil Code, so the Civil 
Code is used when the Mineral Code does not provide a solution to a 
particular issue.18 However, when dealing with matters of mineral law, the
Mineral Code will prevail where it conflicts with the Civil Code.19 
Mineral leases generally provide for the lessor to be paid a mineral 
royalty. The Mineral Code broadly defines a mineral lease royalty, but the
most relevant portion for the purpose of this paper is “any interest in
production, or its value, from or attributable to land subject to a mineral 
lease, that is deliverable or payable to the lessor or others entitled to share 
therein.”20 Essentially, this means that the lessee (oil and gas producer)
pays the lessor (land or servitude owner) some fraction of the money
earned when minerals are produced and sold from the land. Mineral 
9. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:7 (2018); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 91 So. 2d at 211.
10. See sources cited supra note 9.
11. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (2018).
12. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:15.
13. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21 (2018). LA. REV. STAT. § 31:24 (2018).
14. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:22 (2018).
15. Id.
16. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:114.
17. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:2 (2018); Melancon v. Texas Co., 89 So. 2d 135,
142 (1956).
18. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:2 (2018).
19. Id.
20. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:213.
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6512020] COMMENT
lessees can sometimes gain economic benefits from their right to produce
minerals by means other than production, such as in Frey v. Amoco 
Production Co., where the lessee gained economic benefits through a
“take-or-pay” contract.21 
B. Frey v. Amoco: What Was the Dispute?
In gas “take-or-pay” contracts, production companies agree to sell gas
at a set price and pipeline companies agree to purchase a minimum amount
of gas, usually expressed as a percentage of well production.22 If a pipeline 
company does not purchase the agreed upon minimum amount of gas for
the year, it must still pay the price of the minimum, but will retain a right
to take delivery of the gas for a limited amount of time.23 These contracts
essentially give the purchaser has a limited amount of time to take gas that
they agreed to pay for but were not able to take.
In Frey, owners of gas royalty interests (referring to the entire group 
as Frey) brought a suit against Amoco Production Company to recover a 
royalty share for proceeds that Amoco received due to a “take-or-pay” 
settlement with its pipeline purchaser, Columbia Gas Transmission
Corporation.24 As part of the settlement agreement, Amoco was to receive 
$20.9 million for “non-recoupable take-or-pay payments” for gas that the
pipeline purchaser no longer had a right to take delivery because they 
failed to take delivery of the gas during the time given to do so by the
contract.25 Frey claimed that he was entitled to royalty payments under his
mineral lease’s royalty clause, which provided for a “royalty on gas sold
by the Lessee [of] one-fifth (1/5) of the amount realized at the well from 
such sales”.26 The Louisiana Supreme Court rendered a judgment in favor
of Frey, requiring the lessee to pay royalties for the “amount realized,” 
including the take-or-pay payments as part of the “total price” for the gas 
sold and the “economic benefits” that the lessee received from the lease.27 
21. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 178 (La. 1992).
22. A.F. Brooke II, Great Expectations: Assessing the Contract Damages of
the Take-or-Pay Producer, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1992).
23. Id. 
24. Frey, 603 So. 2d at 169.
25. Id. at 170.
26. Id. at 169 (emphasis added). 
27. Id. at 178.
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  298 5/21/20  8:23 AM







   
   
  
 
    

















   
    
    
    
        
  
   
    
    
    
     
    
   
652 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
C. Frey v. Amoco: Total Price Reasoning
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that Frey and the other mineral 
lessors were owed royalties for the take-or-pay payments.28 The ourt
offered two arguments in support of this ruling. The first argument relied
on the mineral lease’s language requiring royalties to be paid when gas is
sold, instead of when gas is produced.29 The court viewed this language as
supporting Frey’s argument that production was not a prerequisite for sale, 
which led the court to include the take-or-pay payments in the total price
for the gas that the buyer received.30 
The court determined that the take-or-pay contract was a sale of a
future thing.31 In Louisiana, a future thing may be the object of a sale, and 
when the thing comes into existence the effect of the sale is retroactive to
the execution of the contract.32 In this case, the future thing is gas that has
yet to be produced, and therefore not yet capable of being owned.33 Once
the gas is produced it becomes capable of being owned.34 The court
reasoned that the sale of the gas was retroactive to when the take-or-pay
contract was signed, instead of occurring when the gas was actually
produced.35 
The court then explained why the payments for the “non-recoupable” 
gas were part of the amount realized by Amoco for the sale of the gas.36 
The amount realized included both the “total price paid by Columbia for 
the natural gas delivered” and the “economic benefits” that Amoco derived
from its right to develop and explore the property of the lessors.37 Amoco,
the lessee, was willing to sell the gas at a lower price “in exchange for the
guarantee the pipeline will either ‘take-or-pay’ for a specific minimum 
quantity of natural gas.”38 The agreement required Columbia, the buyer, to 
pay for a certain amount of gas, at a price lower than market value, 
regardless of whether they could actually take the gas.39 This take-or-pay 
28. Id.
29. Id. at 179.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 178.
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1775 (2018); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1767 (2018); LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2450 (2018); Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 179 (La. 1992).




37. Id. at 179–80.
38. Id. at 180. 
39. Id. 
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6532020] COMMENT
obligation provided the economic incentive for Amoco to enter into the
contract and sell its gas at a reduced price by guaranteeing Amoco would
receive a minimum payment.
The lower sale price used for take-or-pay contracts usually leads to a 
lower royalty payment per unit of gas than if the gas were sold at the
market price, as royalty payments are normally a fraction of the sale
price.40 The Frey court noted that not including the take-or-pay payments
as part of the total price paid for the gas that was taken would “disregard 
the obvious economic considerations underlying the take-or-pay clause.”41 
Further, the court found that the “actual price paid” per unit of gas by the 
buyer should be calculated by “dividing the total quantity of gas delivered 
by the total amount paid to the producer.”42 The “total amount paid to the 
producer” included the take-or-pay payments, so Amoco was required to 
pay royalties on the take-or-pay payments.43 The Frey court then moved 
to their second argument for why the “take-or-pay” payments should be
included within the “amount realized.”
D. Frey v. Amoco: Economic Benefits Reasoning
The court also used the “economic benefits” analysis from Henry v. 
Ballard & Cordell Corp. in its reasoning for including the “take-or-pay” 
payments as part of the “amount realized” for royalty calculation.44 In 
Henry, a mineral lessor wanted to be paid royalties based on the current
market value of gas at the time it was delivered instead of the price from 
the long-term contract that the producer had with the buyer.45 The Henry 
Court found that the market value to be paid under the lease’s royalty 
provision was the price from the “take-or-pay” contract.46 
Part of the court’s reasoning was that a mineral lease arrangement “is
in the nature of a cooperative venture” where the lessor contributed the 
land and the lessee contributed the “capital and expertise necessary to
develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both parties.”47 The 





44. Id. at 173; Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
45. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1335.
46. Id. at 1340.
47. Id. at 1338.
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654 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
or dispose of the product in a reasonable and prudent way to secure the
maximum benefit possible for both parties.”48 
The Henry Court also considered the ultimate objective of royalty 
provisions, which it described as “fix[ing] “the division between the lessor 
and lessee of the economic benefits anticipated from the development of
the minerals.”49 The court noted that it was not practical to give the lessor 
a fractional part of the produced gas (as in pay their royalty in gas rather
than money).50 Instead, leases usually provide for the lessee to “dispose of
the gas (in a prudent manner),” and then make royalty payments to lessors
based on their fractional interests.51 
The Henry Court looked to the mutual intent of the contracting parties
and the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time they made the 
contract.52 The court found that the lessee had an obligation to market the
discovered gas reserves and that there was an “accepted universal
practice” of using long-term gas sales contracts to market gas reserves.53 
There was also a customary practice for lessees to use the price received
under the long-term gas contracts as the market value when making
mineral royalty payments and for lessors to accept royalty payments that 
were calculated in this way.54 This meant that if it were prudent for a lessee
to enter into a “take-or-pay” contract (as it was in Henry), then the market
value used to calculate the lessor’s royalty payments would be based on 
the “take-or-pay” contract’s price, which is usually lower than the market
value for gas that is sold outside of a “take-or-pay” contract.
When considering economic benefits in both Henry and Frey, the
Louisiana Supreme Court adopted Professor Thomas Harrell’s analysis of
how lessees and lessors should split revenues.55 The Harrell Rule applies
48. Id. at 1338 (citing Harrell, Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil & Gas 
Law, The 30th Annual Institute on Oil & Gas Law & Taxation, Southwestern 
Legal Foundation, 311 (1979)).
49. Id. at 1338.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1340.
53. Id.
54. For example:
At trial, defendants presented unrefuted evidence that customary practice 
in the oil and gas industry required the lessee to pay “market value” 
royalties on gas in dollar amounts equivalent to the price received under
a long-term sales contract (less permissible transportation charges), and 
the lessors to accept royalty payments so calculated.
Id.
55. Id. at 1338; Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 173 (La. 1992);
Professor Harrell served on the faculty of LSU Law for 23 years, was named the 
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6552020] COMMENT
when the “lessee’s arrangements to market were prudently arrived at 
consistent with the lessee’s obligation.”56 The rule states that a
determination of market value, which “permits either the lessor or lessee
to receive a part of the gross revenues from the property greater than the 
fractional division contemplated by the lease, should be considered 
inherently contrary to the basic nature of the lease and be sustained only 
in the clearest of cases.”57 Relying on the Henry case and the Harrell rule,
the Frey court concluded “[a]n economic benefit accruing from the leased
land, generated solely by virtue of the lease, and which is not expressly
negated . . . is to be shared between the lessor and lessee in the fractional 
division contemplated by the lease.” The “fractional division 
contemplated by the lease” being the fraction of production that the lessor
is to receive under the mineral royalty provisions.58 
The Frey court pointed out that the case could have been decided on
the “total price paid” reasoning alone, but included the “economic 
benefits” reasoning in order to account for every economic benefit a lessee
might procure through the rights granted to them by their lessor.59 One
way that the court found the economic benefits reasoning to be superior 
was that it would require royalty payments even if no gas had ever actually 
been delivered.60 This was in line with the court’s interpretation in Frey of
the “amount realized” phrasing from the royalty provision. The Frey court 
viewed the “amount realized” as including “the sum total, the whole, or
the final effect of the economic benefits obtained by Amoco” from
exercising the rights granted by the lease.61 This “sum total” was
composed “in part, of the advantages flowing to Amoco by virtue of the
sale of natural gas under the Morganza Contract” (the Morganza Contract
is the contract between Amoco and the pipeline).62 
director of the Louisiana Mineral Law Institute in 1979, served as a Senior Officer
of the Louisiana Law Institute, Vice President of the Louisiana Chapter of the
Association of Henri Capitant, and was on the Legal Committee of the Interstate
Oil Compact Commission. Law Center Mourns Passing of Professor Emeritus 
Thomas Harrell, LSU LAW (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.law.lsu.edu/news/2016/
01/21/law-center-mourns-passing-of-professor-emeritus-thomas-harrell/ [https://
perma.cc/9BQP-48ZX]. 
56. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1338; Frey, 603 So. 2d at 173.
57. See cases cited supra note 56.
58. Frey, 603 So. 2d at 174.
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656 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
The Frey court also discussed the mineral lessee’s implied obligation 
to diligently market the minerals discovered.63 Article 122 of the Mineral
Code states that a “mineral lessee . . . is bound to perform the contract in
good faith and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably 
prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor.”64 
According to the court, if Amoco, the lessee, did not pay a royalty for the 
“take-or-pay” payments, there would be an incentive for Amoco to 
“maximize the lump sum settlement and minimize the future price.”65 This
would cause Frey, the lessor, to receive less in royalty payments when the
same amount of gas is taken.66 
II. HOW CASES SINCE FREY HAVE USED THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
ANALYSIS
A. Cases That Have Followed Frey
There have been a few cases outside of Louisiana where courts 
adopted the economic benefits analysis from Frey. Klein v. Jones involved
a dispute between Arkansas royalty owners and a gas producer over “take-
or-pay” payments.67 The Eighth Circuit explained the “amount realized” 
analysis from Frey and went on to adopt the Harrell rule as part of its 
decision to reverse the district court’s decision which dismissed the 
lessors’ suit for royalty payments.68 
SEECO, Inc. v. Hales was a class-action lawsuit between a group of
royalty owners and a gas producer.69 Part of the dispute involved the
royalty owners claiming that the gas producer should pay royalties on
“take-or-pay” payments that the gas producer had received.70 The
Arkansas Supreme Court required the gas producer to pay royalties on the
“take-or-pay” payments.71 The SEECO Court cited to Klien, which 
adopted the Frey case’s economic benefits reasoning, when describing
63. Id. at 181.
64. LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 31:122 (2018).
65. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 182 (La. 1992).
66. Id.
67. Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521, 531 (8th Cir. 1992).
68. “[A] lease arrangement is in the nature of a cooperative venture in which
the lessor contributes the land and the lessee the capital and experience necessary 
to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both parties.” Id.; Frey v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 173 (La. 1992).
69. SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 22 S.W.3d 157, 161 (Ark. 2000).
70. Id. at 162.
71. Id. at 182.
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how the Harrell Rule allows royalty owners “to receive a portion of the
take-or-pay settlement.”72 In SEECO, the Arkansas Supreme Court
interpreted an Arkansas statute which required royalties to “be paid when
any money is paid to the lessee” for royalty oil or gas.73 The court reasoned 
that “the statute does not specify that the gas has to have been produced or
sold,” and so royalties were to be paid when the lessee received money for
the gas, whether or not it was actually produced.74 The language of the
Arkansas statute is broader than Louisiana’s statutory definition of a
mineral royalty, which reads “any interest in production, or its value, from
or attributable to land subject to a mineral lease, that is deliverable or
payable to the lessor or others entitled to share therein.”75 While the
Louisiana Mineral Code ties royalty payments to an “interest in
production, or its value,” the Frey court’s adoption of the Harrell Rule
expanded when royalty payments would be due to also include situations 
when no production took place.76 
B. Cases That Have not Followed Frey’s Reasoning
While some cases outside of Louisiana have followed the economic 
benefits reasoning from Frey, other cases have not. Cimarex Energy Co.
v. Chastant involved a dispute between lessors and lessees over whether 
royalties should be paid on money generated by Cimarex by “hedging”
activity.77 The U.S. Fifth Circuit opinion described Cimarex’s hedging
activity as “purely financial activity” that involved “simply buying or
selling financial positions.”78 The court found that Cimarex was only 
72. Id. at 181.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 182.
75. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:213 (2018).
76. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 180 (La. 1992).
77. Cimarex Energy Co. v. Chastant, 6:11-CV-1713, 2012 WL 6652360, at
*1 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2012), aff’d, 537 F. App’x 561 (5th Cir. 2013).
78. Id. at *2. The following is an explanation of futures:
A futures contract gives the buyer of the contract, the right and 
obligation, to buy the underlying commodity at the price at which he 
buys the futures contract. On the other hand, a futures contract gives the 
seller of the contract, the right and obligation, to sell the underlying 
commodity at the price at which he sells the futures contract.” Hedging 
commodities allows investors to ensure predictable financial results by
protecting against future price movements. By purchasing futures
contracts, investors can lock in prices that are favorable to an 
organization to continue realizing profits over time. 
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658 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
obligated to pay royalties on oil and gas produced on the land under the
terms of the lease.79 The court reasoned that “the Frey Court specifically
held that the take-or-pay payments were part of the ‘amount realized’
under the terms of the lease at issue.”80 The court believed that having
Cimarex pay royalties on its “hedging” activities based on the Frey
economic benefits reasoning would “overturn decades of Louisiana oil and 
gas law precedent” and would “allow lessors to claim royalties on the
revenue derived from essentially any transaction that a lessee enters into 
because of the oil or gas.”81 
In affirming the district court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit explained
that a critical fact in the case was that “Cimarex’s hedging operations [did]
not affect the market value of those items at the well or on the lease.”82 
This was important because the lease provided for royalties to be paid “on 
the best market price of the gas at the mouth of the well or the oil on the 
leased property.”83 The type of hedging that Cimarex was engaged in did
not affect the price at the wellhead, so the court found the profits of the
trading were not subject to royalty payments.84 
Both the district and appellate court in Cimarex declined to apply the 
“economic benefits” portion of the “amounts realized” analysis to expand 
what activities would require royalty payments.85 Instead, they read the
opinion in Frey as reaffirming “the well-settled principle that ‘the right of 
the owner of a royalty interest is restricted to a share in production if and 
when it is obtained.’”86 This does not appear to be entirely consistent with 
the Frey Court’s decision. As previously mentioned, the Frey Court 
included the “economic benefits” analysis to expand when a lessor would 
receive royalty payments to include “final effect of the economic benefits”
that the lessee obtains through exercising “the rights granted by a
synallagmatic contract of Lease,” including situations where there are
The Fundamentals of Oil & Gas Hedging - Futures, MERCATUS ENERGY
ADVISORS, https://www.mercatusenergy.com/blog/bid/86597/the-fundamentals-
of-oil-gas-hedging-futures [https://perma.cc/7GNJ-U9S6] (last visited Nov. 9, 
2019).
79. Cimarex Energy Co., 2012 WL 6652360, at *2.
80. Id. at *3.
81. Id. at *4.




85. Cimarex Energy Co, 2012 WL 6652360, at *3. 
86. Id.; 537 F. App’x at 565–66.
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6592020] COMMENT
“take-or-pay” payments but no gas is produced.87 Had the Cimarex court 
applied this portion of the “amount realized” analysis, it might have found 
that the hedging activity that Cimarex was engaging in was a benefit
derived from the rights granted to them by the lease, and would then fall
within the “amount realized” and be subject to royalty payments.
The Louisiana Supreme Court revisited the “mutual benefit: principal 
from Frey in Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co. Caskey involved a mineral lessor’s 
attempt to enjoin a lessee from using a road on the leased land to conduct 
mineral operations on neighboring land.88 The court’s decision turned on 
whether the “mutual benefit” principle encompassed the contractual right 
to reasonable use of the surface for operations on adjacent lands that the
lessee was granted under the adjacent lands clause of the lease.89 The
purpose of the adjacent lands clause was to allow reasonable surface use
of the lessor’s land to conduct operations on adjacent land.90 The “mutual
benefit” principle, codified in Louisiana Mineral Code article 122, 
requires a mineral lessee to “develop and operate the property leased as a 
reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his 
lessor.”91 The court did not find any authority that the mutual benefit 
principle’s scope should extend to include the contractual right to 
reasonable use of the surface.92 It also found that its holding did not
conflict with Frey, as the Caskey court did not interpret the use of adjacent
lands as an economic benefit flowing from the leased land or implicating
the royalty clause in any manner.93 While the lessee was attaining an
economic benefit in a sense, because they would likely not have used the
land unless it was beneficial, it seems this sort of benefit was too 
attenuated. Had there been some direct payment associated with the use or
some other way for the court to calculate what the economic benefit was,
the court may have come to a different conclusion.
Harvey E. Yates Company v. Powell was a New Mexico case that 
involved a dispute between a gas lessee and the New Mexico 
Commissioner of Public Lands over whether a State Land Office
regulation was valid.94 The regulation required royalty payments on “take-
or-pay” payments.95 The Harvey court considered both Frey and Klein, 
87. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 180 (La. 1992).
88. Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (La. 1999).
89. Id. at 1260.
90. Id. at 1263.
91. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 (2018).
92. Caskey, 737 So. 2d at 1262.
93. Id.
94. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 1996).
95. Id.
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660 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
finding that both cases adopted the cooperative venture approach “largely
because of unique state statutes which expanded the definition of ‘royalty’
in mineral leases.”96 Meanwhile, New Mexico’s statute specifically
connected royalty payments to the production of gas.97 The Harvey court
did not find the reasoning in Frey and Klein persuasive due to the
difference in the states’ statutory definition of mineral royalties.98 
These cases show that the economic benefits argument used in Frey
can be used in other states, like Arkansas, that have broad definitions for
mineral royalties, but not in states that directly tie royalty payments to
production of minerals. The Cimarex decision indicates that courts might
not be willing to require royalty payments for all economic benefits that
lessees derive from the rights granted to them by the lease.
III. LIKELIHOOD OF COURTS USING REASONING SIMILAR TO FREY IN 
SITUATIONS WHERE OPERATORS ARE PAID TO USE CARBON DIOXIDE IN 
ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY PROJECTS
A. Likelihood of Louisiana Applying Frey for Carbon Dioxide Payments
As previously explained, a cooperative venture exists between a lessor
and a lessee when there is a mineral lease.99 This cooperative venture
creates an implied obligation for the lessee to “market or dispose of the 
product in a reasonable and prudent way to secure the maximum benefit
possible for both parties.”100 According to the Frey court, “[e]ncompassed 
within the lessee’s duty to market diligently is the obligation to obtain the 
best price reasonably possible.”101 
The lessor grants the operator (lessee) rights that allow the operator to
produce minerals from the land. Some companies might pay oil operators 
96. Id. at 1233.
97. “‘Royalty,’ as used in connection with mineral leases, means any interest
in production, or its value, from or attributable to land subject to a mineral lease, 
that is deliverable or payable to the lessor or others entitled to share therein.” LA.
REV. STAT. § 31:213(5) (2000); “Rather, New Mexico’s only pertinent statute 
specifically connects the payment of royalties to the production of gas. N.M.
STAT. § 19–10–4.1 (Michie 1994) (royalties are due on gas which is ‘produced 
and saved from the leased premises’).” Harvey, 98 F.3d at 1233.
98. Harvey, 98 F.3d at 1233.
99. The lessor contributes the land and the lessee contributes the “capital and 
expertise necessary to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both parties.”
Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1338 (La. 1982).
100. Id. (quoting Thomas Harrell, Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil & Gas
Law, 30 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 311 (1979)).
101. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 175 (La. 1992).
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  307 5/21/20  8:23 AM










   
  
  










     
 





     




    
   
   
   
    
   
    
 
6612020] COMMENT
to store carbon dioxide for them in order to avoid the would-be carbon tax.
If this happened, the operator would be receiving an “economic benefit” 
based on its ability to store carbon dioxide on the leased land, and this is
not accounted for by the royalty on produced minerals. This “economic
benefit” would be “accruing from the leased land, generated solely by
virtue of the lease” and “is not expressly negated.”102 Under the Harrell
rule used by the Frey court, this economic benefit should be “shared
between the lessor and lessee in the fractional division contemplated by 
the lease.”103 If the economic benefits analysis from Frey were applied, a
court would likely find that lessors are owed a royalty on the payments for 
carbon dioxide storage because the company is directly profiting from 
their operations on the land.
It is possible that a court may elect not to apply the economic benefits 
analysis. The “amount realized” reasoning was partially based on treating
the “take-or-pay” contract as a sale of a future thing.104 This allowed the
“take-or-pay” payments to be treated as part of the total price (amount 
realized) received for the gas that the lessee sold, even when the pipeline
company did not take the amount of gas it paid for.105 Unlike a “take-or-
pay” situation, a third party who pays the lessee to use its carbon dioxide
in order to avoid a hypothetical carbon tax is not buying any oil or gas, so
the money the third party pays to the lessee could not be lumped in as part 
of the total price of oil or gas, as was done in Frey.106 
Not considering the payments for carbon dioxide storage as part of the 
“total price” does not necessarily mean that the mineral lessor would be 
unable to receive royalty payments. This is because the Frey court chose 
to include the economic benefits as part of the amount realized instead of
relying only on the total price.107 However, it does leave open the
possibility of courts continuing to distinguish Frey, as was done by the 
Cimerax court. While the lessee would be paid to store the carbon dioxide, 
this payment would not be part of a sale of oil or gas, and it would not 
influence the market value of the oil being produced, which was part of
the reasoning for not requiring royalty payments in Cimarax.108 The fact
that the activity the lessee is receiving money for, pumping the carbon into 
the subsurface, requires direct use of the leased land in the manner 
102. Id. at 174.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 179.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 180.
107. Id.
108. Cimarex Energy Co. v. Chastant, 537 F. App’x 561, 564 (5th Cir. 2013)
(per curiam).
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662 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
contemplated by the lease would make courts more likely to apply the
economics benefits reasoning in the carbon dioxide situation. Whereas, in
the types of situations dealt with in Cimarex or in Caskey, a court would 
be more likely to find that this activity falls within the lessee’s “mutual 
benefit” obligation because it directly involves how the lessee is
developing and operating the leased property.
When the Frey court applied the “amounts realized” analysis, the court 
explained that lessees could be encouraged to set up “take-or-pay”
contracts that were not as beneficial to the lessor if they did not require
royalty payments on “take-or-pay” payments.109 The court was worried 
that if royalty payments were not required for “take-or-pay” payments,
then lessees would have an incentive to maximize “take-or-pay”
payments.110 Lessees take avoid paying as much in royalties by setting the
price of gas low and requiring high amounts of gas to be taken in the
contract with the pipeline purchaser.111 Assuming the pipeline company
took around the same amount of gas, the lessee could receive the same
amount of money from the buyer since the buyer has agreed to pay for a
minimum amount of gas, whether or not it can actually take the gas. While 
the lessee could receive the same amount of money, they would have to 
pay much less in royalties to the lessor because the gas would be “sold” at 
a lower price. This difference in the royalties received is because most of
the money paid to the lessee would now be “take-or-pay” payments, which
are paid when gas is not taken. The Frey court wanted to avoid allowing 
lessees to manipulate the “take-or-pay” contracts to avoid paying royalties 
to their lessor.112 The same type of situation is less likely to occur when a
third party pays the lessee to take carbon dioxide. Instead of lessees
manipulating contracts to avoid paying lessors royalties on production,
lessees would be encouraged to do more enhanced recovery projects using
carbon dioxide injection. More enhanced recovery projects would likely 
lead to more royalties being paid to lessors from the increased production.
B. Possible Use in Other States
States that define mineral royalties broadly (not tying the royalty
payments specifically to production) would be more likely to use the 
economic benefits analysis to require royalty payments for carbon dioxide
that lessees are paid to use. States that specifically connect royalty
payments to production of minerals, like New Mexico in Harvey, would 
109. Id. at 182.
110. Id.
111. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 182 (La. 1992).
112. Id. at 182.
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6632020] COMMENT
be less likely to use the economic benefits analysis because the money
received for taking the carbon is not directly connected to mineral
production.113 Even a state with a broader royalty definition, like
Arkansas, which used the Harrell rule to require royalties for “take-or-pay” 
payments,114 might have trouble extending the economic benefits analysis
to payments for using carbon dioxide. Arkansas requires the lessee to pay 
“to the lessor or his assignees the same price . . . for royalty oil or gas that
is paid the operator or lessee under the working lease thereunder.”115 The
royalty payments are still connected to the oil or gas, so the SEECO and
Klein courts’ analysis would not necessarily expand to include money paid
to the lessee to use carbon dioxide on the leased land. Even so, Arkansas 
and states with similar royalty definitions would still be more likely to 
require royalty payments for carbon storage than states with a more limited
definition for mineral royalties.
C. If a Mineral Servitude is on the Land, Who Should Receive the 
Payments?
If the “economic benefits” argument is used to require royalty
payments for carbon dioxide stored or used as part of an enhanced
recovery project, a question could arise as to who should receive these 
carbon dioxide royalty payments. In Louisiana, a landowner can create a
mineral servitude as long as they own the right to explore for and produce 
minerals at the time that the servitude is created.116 Mineral servitudes
grant the servitude holder the right to explore for and produce minerals
from the land of another.117 If a mineral servitude existed on the land, the
landowner may attempt to challenge the servitude owner’s right to store
or use carbon dioxide on the land.
The landowner owns everything that is “directly above or under” the 
land.118 The pore space (the space between the grains that form the rocks)
is in the subsurface portion of the land and, thus, would be owned by the
landowner. Since the landowner owns the pore space, and a mineral
servitude only grants the holder the right to explore for and produce
113. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 1996).
114. SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 22 S.W.3d 157, 181 (Ark. 2000); Klein v. Jones, 
980 F.2d 521, 531 (8th Cir. 1992).
115. SEECO, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 157 at 182.
116. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:24 (2018).
117. “A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land belonging to
another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing
them to possession and ownership.” LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21.
118. LA. CIV. CODE art. 490 (2018).
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664 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
minerals from the land, the landowner would retain ownership and the 
right to use the pore space for storage.119 In a state that allows for a
permanent severance of the mineral estate from the surface estate, like
Texas, the surface estate owner would also maintain ownership of the 
actual pore space.120 A landowner may attempt to challenge royalty 
payments paid to a servitude holder on the basis that the operator is paying
the royalties for carbon dioxide being stored on the land, not minerals
being produced from the land.
If the mineral servitude owner’s lessee (the operator) was only using
the land for storage and not conducting an enhanced oil recovery project 
using the carbon dioxide, the landowner would likely succeed. Before a 
mineral servitude is created by the landowner, the landowner owns every 
right to explore for and produce minerals, and to use the pore space for 
storage.121 The rights granted to the servitude owner cover mineral
exploration and production, but not use of the pore space for storage.122 
The servitude owner cannot grant their lessee rights that the servitude does
not grant its holder. 
In Louisiana, a servitude owner “is entitled to use only so much of the 
land as is reasonably necessary to conduct his operations,” the operations 
being exploration for and production of minerals form the land.123 When 
the lessee is injecting carbon dioxide for the sole purpose of sequestering
it, the lessee is attempting to use rights that the mineral lease did not grant
them. In fact, the mineral servitude owner could not grant the lessee rights
119. “Under the ‘American rule,’ also referred to as an ownership-in-place 
theory, ‘a mineral rights holder owns the mineral beneath the land, but the rest of 
the geological formation—including the pore space in which the CO2 would be
stored—is owned by the surface interest owner.’” BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK
H. MARTIN, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 222 (2017) (quoting
ELIZABETH LOKEY ALDRICH ET AL., ENERGY POLICY INST., ANALYSIS OF
EXISTING AND POSSIBLE REGIMES FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION:
A REVIEW FOR POLICYMAKERS 19 (2011), https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/epi-ccs-pore-space-regimes.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QN
N-49G3]).
120. “[W]e conclude that the surface estate owner controls the earth beneath 
the surface estate.” Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E & P Onshore LLC, 480 
S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. App. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko 
E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017).
121. LA. CIV. CODE art. 490 (2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 31:6 (2018).
122. “However, the severance of minerals should not be construed as 
authorizing the mineral owner without the consent of the surface owner to use the
surface for purposes other than exploration, development and production of 
“native” minerals.” KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 119.
123. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:22 (2018).
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6652020] COMMENT
to store the carbon dioxide when it is not reasonably necessary for 
production (as the mineral servitude owner cannot give the lessee rights 
that the landowner still retains). Injecting carbon dioxide purely for storage 
purposes would infringe upon rights that the landowner did not give to the 
lessee in the servitude. Therefore, the landowner would be the proper party
to receive royalties for carbon dioxide if it was injected purely for storage 
purposes instead of as part of an enhanced recovery project. Courts in other
states would likely come to similar results.124 
However, the results would be different when the carbon dioxide is
injected into the subsurface as part of an enhanced oil recovery project.
The servitude grants its holder the right to explore for and produce 
minerals from the land.125 Enhanced oil recovery projects that involve
carbon dioxide injection lead to increased production.126 Even though the
carbon dioxide is being pumped into the pore space, which is owned by 
the landowner, the land is being used as reasonably necessary to produce 
minerals from the land. Since the lessee received the right to explore for 
and produce minerals from the servitude owner, the carbon dioxide 
injection activity would not be infringing upon the rights that were retained 
by the landowner when it is reasonably necessary to produce minerals.
A landowner might also take issue with carbon dioxide left
sequestered within the pore space of their land after the servitude or lease
ends. Louisiana Mineral Code article 22 states that the owner of a mineral 
servitude “is obligated, insofar as practicable, to restore the surface to its
original condition at the earliest reasonable time.”127 As explained before,
if the injection took place as part of an enhanced oil recovery project, then
the carbon dioxide was properly placed there as part of reasonably 
necessary efforts to produce minerals.128 
Mineral servitudes are made for the purpose of allowing someone
other than the landowner to produce minerals from the land and to do 
reasonably necessary things to accomplish this. To produce the minerals,
the contents of the pore space will experience some change.129 When these
changes are reasonably necessary to produce minerals from the land, the
landowner would not have a right of action against the lessor or servitude 
124. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 119.
125. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21 (2018).
126. Enhanced Oil Recovery, OFF. OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/fe/
science-innovation/oil-gas-research/enhanced-oil-recovery [https://perma.cc/9G
QJ-5HYB] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
127. Id.
128. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:22 (2018).
129. These changes could be removal of minerals, water flooding, or carbon 
dioxide injection.
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666 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
owner; but if the changes were not reasonably necessary the landowner 
could have a valid claim against the servitude owner and the lessee, 
depending on other laws or regulations in the jurisdiction.130 
D. Possible Liabilities for Lessors
Whether the operator had a lease with a servitude owner or a 
landowner, injecting carbon dioxide into the subsurface purely for storage
reasons without a provision in the lease allowing them to do so could be a
breach of the lease and lead to the operator being sued for damages. In
Corbello v. Iowa Production, Shell was sued for breaching a lease because
of unauthorized saltwater disposal,131 when the lease required Shell to 
restore the land to its original condition.132 Because Shell disposed of
unauthorized saltwater on the property, it was found to have breached the
lease, leaving it liable for damages from the disposal and for the cost of
restoring the land.133 Shell argued that the damages for restoration should 
be limited to the value of the land if it was restored, instead of the much
higher cost of restoring the land; but the court found that the lease
provision requiring Shell to restore the land was controlling and required 
Shell to pay the amount necessary to restore the land to its original
130. “Unless a statute or agreement provides to the contrary, the consent of the 
owner of the premises is required for a program of underground storage or 
disposal that requires surface locations for injection and withdrawal wells,
pipelines, compressor stations, and other surface rights.” KRAMER & MARTIN,
supra note 119.
131. Corbello stated the following:
The above quoted provision unambiguously sets forth what saltwater
Shell can dispose of on the leased premises: saltwater produced by it on 
the Heyd property or any other property in the Iowa Field. Disposal of
saltwater produced in the Iowa Field by anyone other than Shell was not
authorized and disposal of saltwater produced by Shell anywhere other
than the Heyd property or in the Iowa Field was not authorized.
Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 704 (La. 2003).
132. “Plaintiffs maintain that the parties bargained for, among other things, 
reasonable restoration of the property to its original condition, in exchange for 
Shell’s use of the land for production of oil and gas for profit.” Id. at 693.
133. “Accordingly, we find that the court of appeal did not err in finding that
Shell’s disposal of saltwater from Shell’s Gas Plant outside the Iowa Field, the
Hawthorne lease, the Kings Bayou lease, and the Mobile Gas Plant was a breach 
of the 1961 contractual lease.” Id. at 704; “Shell must not be allowed to now alter 
the terms of this contract by limiting its liability to an amount reasonably or
rationally related to the market value of the property.” Id. at 695.
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condition ($33,000,000).134 A lessor injecting carbon dioxide into the
subsurface for storage purposes could be forced to pay for the cost of
restoring the land to its original condition if it did not have the rights to do 
so.135 As seen in Corbello, restoration costs may prove to be very costly,
but this may be limited by Louisiana’s laws on carbon sequestration.136 
The carbon dioxide plume may travel to subsurface areas that are not
covered by the leased land. If the plume does this, it could displace more 
valuable minerals on neighboring land, possibly leading to neighbors 
seeking damages for displaced minerals.137 The rule of capture insulates
producers from liability when oil and gas migrates from neighboring 
property due to production.138 A “negative rule of capture” has been 
suggested, which would insulate injectors from damages based on their
injected fluid or gas migrating onto the property of others.139 The negative
rule of capture has not been universally adopted, though, leaving operators
134. “We find that the contractual terms of a contract, which convey the
intentions of the parties, overrule any policy considerations behind such a rule
limiting damages in tort cases.” Id. at 694–95.
135. See LA. REV. STAT. § 30:1109 (2018) (discussing carbon sequestration 
liability issues). 
136. Id.
137. One treatise states the following:
For purposes of cycling, recycling, secondary recovery operations,
disposal of saltwater produced with oil, or storage of gas near a market,
a landowner (or his mineral grantee or lessee) may desire to inject fluids
(gas, water or air) into an underground structure. The fluid injected may 
migrate to a portion of the structure underlying the land of another and 
in the course of such migration displace valuable substances in such land.
BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS 
LAW § 204.5 (2019).
138. “In order to prove an actionable trespass, one has to show an injury and
the rule of capture insulates from liability a party whose well is bottomed beneath
its own land even where the oil or gas is migrating from beneath another’s land.”
Id.
139. This explanation comes from a treatise:
Just as under the rule of capture a landowner may capture such oil or gas
as will migrate from adjoining premises to a well bottomed on his own 
land, so also may be inject into a formation substances which may 
migrate through the structure to the land of others, even if this results in
the displacement under such land of more valuable with less valuable
substances (e.g., the displacement of wet gas by dry gas).
Id.
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668 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
vulnerable when the land that may be affected has not been unitized.140 
Injectors have been held liable for nuisance in Oklahoma, trespass in
Arkansas, and a landowner in Nebraska was able to recover “what he can
prove by a preponderance of evidence he could have obtained through his
own efforts if he had drilled, developed, and operated his property . . . .”141 
E. How Would Royalty Payments be Calculated?
If royalty payments were required for carbon dioxide used on the land, 
questions would likely arise about what costs could be deducted from the
money received by the lessor when calculating the royalty payments. Since 
the royalty would be required under the mineral lease, rules used when
calculating mineral royalties could be applied by analogy to determine
what costs are deductible. Often, mineral leases allow for costs that are
incurred after the well to be proportionally deducted from mineral
royalties (this is called the netback method).142 When drilling a well, “costs
of production” (drilling, geophysical surveys, secondary recovery, etc.)
are borne by the operator (lessee) alone.143 Non-operators, lessors, and
royalty owners are required to bear their proportionate share of “post-
production” costs (transportation, compression, and treatments to make
minerals marketable).144 While a mineral lessee cannot deduct the costs
involved with enhanced oil recovery projects from the mineral royalty, as 
those costs are going towards producing the mineral, some costs may be
deductible from a royalty that is being paid from the operator taking 
carbon dioxide. 
140. “It is hazardous, therefore, to engage in a secondary recovery program in
the absence of unitization (voluntary or compulsory) of all premises which may 
be adversely affected by injection of fluids.” Id.
141. “However, this is not what took place, and instead there was the intrusion 
of saltwater injected by defendant constituting a private nuisance under State 
decisions.” Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439, 
443 (10th Cir. 1971); “The appellant has a vested existing property right in the 
brominated saltwater underlying his land, and the action of the defendants in
forcibly removing that solution by means of injection and production wells on 
surrounding property constitutes an actionable trespass.” Young v. Ethyl Corp., 
521 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1975); Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 184 Neb. 384,
399–400, 168 N.W.2d 510, 519 (1969).
142. 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 645 (2018).
143. “The expenses incurred in exploring for mineral substances and in 
bringing such substances to the surface are clearly ‘costs of production’ and are 
not chargeable against the usual royalty or non-operating interest absent some
express contractual provision to the contrary.” Id. § 645.1.
144. Id. § 645.2.
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6692020] COMMENT
The netback method attempts to determine the value of minerals at the 
valuation point (usually the well) by deducting post production costs from
the sales price.145 In a situation involving royalties for carbon dioxide
injected into the well, the operator would be paid to take the carbon 
dioxide, then would transport it to the well, and then inject it into the well.
The placement of the valuation point will affect what costs are deductible
from the sales price.146 If the valuation point is set at the point where the
operator takes possession of the gas, costs would not be deductible, as that
is the same point that the prices for taking the gas was set. Since the
operator is being paid to store or use the carbon dioxide, which requires
the operator to inject the carbon dioxide into the subsurface, it would make
more sense to set the valuation point at the injection point.147 This would 
allow for the carbon dioxide injection to be treated essentially as the
reverse of production when calculating the royalty.148 With the valuation
point set at the injection point instead of the point at which the operator 
takes the carbon dioxide, transportation costs (and other costs incurred by 
the operator between taking the gas and injecting it) could be deducted
from the royalty in order to determine the value at the lease.149 
There is a possibility that the deductible costs (transportation, etc.)
could be higher than the price being paid to the operator to take the carbon 
dioxide, which would lead to no royalty being paid when the valuation 
point is set at the injection site. The price paid to the operator would likely
depend on the severity of the carbon tax, as the carbon dioxide producer 
would be willing to pay more to avoid a higher tax. If the price being paid 
to operators to take the carbon is outweighed by the transportation costs 
then operators would not inject carbon dioxide just to inject it for storage,
as they would take a loss. Many operators would likely still opt for this 
145. BRUCE M. KRAMER, Royalty Interest in the United States: Not Cut From
the Same Cloth, 29 TULSA L.J. 449, 461 (1994).
146. “Under the net-back or work-back methodology ‘value at the point of 
valuation is determined by taking the downstream sales price and deducting from
it the costs incurred by the working interest owner . . . to move the gas from the 
point of valuation to the actual point of sale.’” Elliott Indus. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 
407 F.3d 1091, 1100 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005).
147. Essentially, set the valuation point at the same place as it would be when
producing minerals (the well). 
148. Injecting carbon dioxide is essentially the reverse of producing something
from the land, as the operator is being paid to take something and put it into the
subsurface instead of taking something out of the subsurface and selling it.
149. “Properly understood, the netback method is not a means of cost-shifting; it
is a means of determining the net profit on the oil and gas by ‘netting’ the gross profit.”
Anderson Living Tr. v. Energen Res. Corp., 879 F.3d 1088, 1094 (10th Cir. 2018).
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option when conducting enhanced oil recovery, though, as it could still be 
cheaper than buying carbon dioxide to use.
CONCLUSION
Whether lessors receive royalty payments for carbon dioxide that the 
lessor is paid to use depends on whether Louisiana courts are willing to
apply the “economic benefits” analysis from Henry and Frey when the
transaction is not directly related to the sale of the minerals. If the “amount
realized” analysis is applied broadly, then courts would likely require
royalty payments for money received by lessees to use carbon dioxide on 
the land, as this money would be an economic benefit derived from the 
lessee’s use of the leased land. Courts could take a more limited approach 
to the amounts realized analysis though, as was done in Cimarex. Courts 
might use the “economic benefits” analysis only when activity is related
to the sale or production of minerals. Essentially, courts might only 
consider economic benefits as part of the amounts realized when the “total
price” reasoning from Frey could also apply.
Scott Johnson* 
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